

National Intelligence Officers

3 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Turner

FROM : Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

SUBJECT : PRM 10

1. The latest draft terms of reference for PRM 10, Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review, are attached (Tab A). Principals are asked to comment to Dr. Brzezinski by close of business Friday, 4 March. Should you wish to engage yourself at this stage, a proposed reply for your signature is also attached in draft. (Tab B).

2. The President and Secretary Brown have made clear their view of the importance of this project and we must give it our best effort. It is, however, an extremely ambitious undertaking, especially in the net assessment field. Almost certainly the study finally produced will have to be more tightly focused than that now envisaged in the terms of reference. If not carefully managed, it could become a bureaucratic nightmare, and the managers (essentially Lyn Davis of ISA and Sam Huntington and Vic Utgoff of NSC Staff) are not broadly experienced in such matters.

3. I attended an interagency meeting chaired by Utgoff and Huntington that discussed an earlier, and quite similar, draft on 1 March. No one present proposed any narrowing of the terms of reference. Rather, the consensus of the departmental and agency representatives was that many pitfalls could be avoided by placing primary emphasis on an effort by the two Working Groups proposed in Paras. IIC and IIIC to produce by 1 April detailed outlines and tasking assignments. Implicit in such an effort would be a sharper definition of the project. Your staffs share this view, and for this reason the response we recommend for you does not propose extensive revisions at this stage.

4. Whatever the shape of the final paper, the intelligence effort to support it will be large and complex, and will strain the resources of the Community. Fortunately, much of the necessary work has been done and many

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other relevant projects are underway. Nevertheless, we will be unable to do all that every task group or sub-group chairman would like to have done. We will need an intelligence structure that will enable you to:

- Keep your hand on the intelligence effort as a whole;
- Set priorities and avoid duplication;
- Employ to the maximum work completed or in progress;
- Ensure that all Agency interests are adequately represented and that tasks are equitably allotted.

5. With the informal concurrence of John McMahon for your Community Staff, Sayre Stevens for CIA, VAdm. Inman for DIA, and Ambassador Kirk for INR, I recommend the following organizational arrangements, and if you approve will establish them when the terms of reference are issued. (See sketch at Tab C).

- I will represent you on the PRC Military Strategy and Force Posture Group and on the SCC Net Assessment Group, which are to be at the Assistant Secretary level.

- [] nominally NIO for Economics, and [] NIO for Soviet and East European Affairs, will represent you on the corresponding Working Groups.

- Howard Stoertz and [] NIOs for Strategic Programs and Conventional Forces respectively, will have important responsibilities running across both halves of the project. In addition, they must ride herd on concurrent efforts on SALT and MBFR. We therefore propose that they not engage directly in organization of the study at this stage, as they would normally do.

- Within the Intelligence Community there already exists an informal National Intelligence Steering Group consisting of the production chiefs of CIA, DIA, State, and myself which has met occasionally to discuss tasking problems. We will activate this group to provide overall coordination of the intelligence effort and set priorities and assignments, under your guidance. As task groups are established and specific tasks are defined, [] will bring them to the Steering Group for assignment of a Community representative and for allocation of production responsibility. (The Steering Group will not engage in substantive coordination;

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this work be cumbersome in the extreme. Interagency
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(informal.)

6. In the past the DCI has insisted that comprehensive net assessments not be undertaken by the Intelligence Community. It should provide the Red side information, DoD the Blue, and some independent authority under the NSC should conduct the final assessment with the assistance of both. Part III of the project is structured this way. We are acting on the assumption that, at least for the present exercise, you will maintain the position taken by your predecessors.



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Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

Attachments:

Tab A
Tab B
Tab C

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

3 March 1977

Admiral Turner

There has not been time for coordination of this memorandum. It reflects discussion with appropriate members of your staffs and contains their suggestions. As noted, however, the suggested organizational arrangements have the concurrence of the Community agencies primarily involved.



Richard Lehman
D/DCI/NI

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